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4In the U.S. occupation of Germany, on the other hand, control of the cultural apparatuses (publication, broadcasting, etc.) and support among the intellectuals were much greater concerns, although hardly the most important aspects of occupation policy (see Schivelbusch 1998 ). American occupation planners had a similar concern in Japan (Dower 1999); in both cases, "reorientation" away from Nazism and militarism, respectively, meant transforming political, social, and economic structures and institutions in the occupied countries, as well as altering the mindsets of the local people. For the latter, of course, censorship and manipulation of cultural production were essential. As we shall see, "reorientation" in Korea was not an active U.S. policy until the Korean War.
Education and Intellectuals in the Early
Occupation Period, 1945-46 From the vantage point of the Korean War, the U.S. military looked back on the 1945-48 occupation of South Korea with considerable self-criticism. In 1950, the U.S. Army acknowledged that the first year and a half of the occupation was "not productive in the field of reorientation" (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). U.S. cultural policy in Korea was quite unclear before the Korean War, with the partial exception of education, for which the military government (MG) had a rather consistent, if somewhat ill-conceived, policy. Schools in Korea had been closed since the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, and one of the MG's first priorities was to reopen the schools. As the MG later admitted, however, "American education personnel were all but totally ignorant of Korean educational conditions," relying on missionaries and especially the Japanese for information (Occupation, 1). On 10 September, an education officer was sent from Okinawa; he read everything he knew about Korea in the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Service (JANIS) report on the boat to Inchon. After briefings from Japanese and Korean officials of the colonial Department of Education, the MG education officer met with sixteen "eminent Koreans" in the field of education on 16 September and out of this group founded a seven-member Korean Committee on Education (Occupation, 15). The MG's General Order No. 4 called for all public elementary schools to be reopened by 24 September 1945 and private schools to be reopened with the permission of the American authorities. In a rather quaintly Americanized language, the order proclaimed that there would be "no racial or religious discrimination" in schools, the language of instruction would be Korean, and "teaching of no subject and observance of no practice inimical to Korea" would be allowed (SKIG 1947, 4). In practice, however, the MG maintained the Japanese system and retained Japanese administrators when schools were reopened 24 September (Occupation, 16). The ultimate goal of the U.S. planners was an education system fully staffed by Koreans but structured along American lines.
Education would be a much more problematic area than the occupation planners had anticipated. The MG was faced with the "bewildering restlessness of student bodies and faculty members during [the] first two years of occupation," especially student and faculty strikes, which were a frequent occurrence until 1948 (Occupation, 2). The MG sarcastically noted that "exuberance over the Japanese surrender has led students into assuming [that} freedom means student control of a school" (SKIG 1947, 6 ). Some of the MG's problems stemmed from the poverty and economic dislocation of postliberation Korea, in which textbooks were almost nonexistent and educational facilities deplorable; some arose out of the political and personal disputes that emerged in the schools, the most important being left-right conflicts and accusations of collaboration with the Japanese. Some of the problems were clearly of the MG's own making, a result of its ignorance and insensitivity.
One notable example of this insensitivity was the use of school buildings for billeting occupation personnel. General John R. Hodge, commander of U.S. occupation forces, prohibited this on 29 September, but his prohibition was not widely circulated or enforced. When the U.S. Army's Twenty-ninth General Hospital first moved into Ewha Women's University, Ewha President Helen Kim (Kim Hwal-lan) protested, and the hospital was moved to the scientific school at Keijo Imperial University, destroying many faculty papers and a great deal of scientific equipment in the process. The hospital remained on campus until fall 1948, by which time Keijo Imperial had been remade into Seoul National University (SKIG 1947, 8) .
The restructuring of elementary and secondary education along American lines went relatively smoothly. The area of higher education was where the U.S. military government faced its greatest difficulties. Strikes by both students and professors recurred throughout the first two years of occupation, the largest and most violent being the Seoul National University strike that began in late 1946. The SNU strike began over the proposed merger in accordance with USAMGIK Ordinance No. 102 of ten colleges in Seoul into one university, which was strongly opposed by students and faculty. 
U.S. Cultural Policy and Its Critics
By 1948, South Korean students seemed relatively pacified and the education reforms more or less in place. In other areas of culture, the USAMGIK made much less effort and paid little attention, and problems, although of a different nature, were also acute. A few Americans in the lower ranks of the occupation expressed their concern over these problems. One such person was Ely Haimowitz in the USAMGIK Department of Education. Haimowitz, a classical pianist trained at Juilliard, arrived in November 1945 to be the USAMGIK's advisor for music programs. He remained in this position until the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) was created in August 1947 and then became an advisor on cultural affairs to General Hodge's Twenty-fourth Corps headquarters until December. Although Haimowitz was not a high-ranking member of the MG, he seems to have been the only officer with regular, sustained, and official contact with members of the Korean arts world, including not only Korean musicians but also writers and artists of various kinds. Haimowitz took to his task with evident enthusiasm. His main work initially was setting up music education in schools and for teachers. Greatly impressed with the talent and discipline of Korean musicians, he helped build up the Korea Symphony Orchestra, the Korean Opera Association, the Seoul Symphony Orchestra, the Seoul Conservatory, and the first Department of Music at Seoul National University. Haimowitz also brought a Korean director and concert pianist to New York for study at Juilliard and tried to promote Korean music in the United States. His special passion, however, was the discovery and promotion of "native" music in Korea. He frequently went to the countryside in search of rural music, and beginning in 1946 he promoted an annual farmer's music festival in cooperation with the new National Music Academy.
Along the way, Haimowitz encountered numerous frustrations and obstacles, not the least of which was the arrogant philistinism of the U.S. occupation forces that was exacerbated by official occupation policy, which discouraged fraternization, forbade Koreans from performing in the "American" theater (which had been the best theater in Seoul before liberation), and did not allow Koreans to be entertained in American billets. Another of the more irritating obstacles was the Yi royal family, which treated its palace grounds as private property rather than public cultural assets. The main Seoul zoo, for example, was the grounds of Ch'angdok palace; when the USAMGIK tried to put it under the jurisdiction of the science museum, royal family workers refused to take care of the animals. To address the film needs of reorientation, the Motion Picture Program Abroad was initiated in September 1948. That month, Kenneth C. Royall, secretary of the army, met in New York with Eric Johnston, president of the MPA, to ask whether "the American motion picture industry could supply sufficient one and two reel films to meet the needs of reorientation and reeducation in these occupied or liberated countries" (National Archives, RG 319e, 1). MPA Vice President Francis S. Harmon analyzed all short films that had been produced since 1941; in October he wrote back with a suggested list of seventy-eight films, of which the MPA could supply half, with the rest to be produced by the Motion Picture Section of the U.S. Army to fit local conditions. "The entire film program overseas should present the American way of life," Harmon wrote, and he proposed that "a limited number of documentaries which deal directly with our basic institutions spell out in a manner quite unnecessary for American audiences, the successful operation of our democratic processes for Germans, Austrians, Japanese and Korean audiences" (National Archives, RG 319e, 1). The program needed more films "which deal with the daily life and work of average Americans, the cultural and educational activities of American communities, music, art and religion, the manifold activities of women, and with the successful operation of our democratic institutions." The films should "avoid the flavor of propaganda" and present their subjects "in an objective manner designed to let the facts speak for themselves" (National Archives, RG 319e, 2-3). The films should be sensitive to the devastation and poverty of the occupied areas and "avoid picturing the United States as a land of abundance and luxury." Rather, they "should show the simplicity of living in the United States." The main emphasis of these films should be on democracy in action, "the grass roots pushing upward ... common men working in association to solve their problems, whatever their nature.... We should aim to show in each picture, in miniature, 140,000,000 people who live democracy in their daily action" (National Archives, RG 319e, 3, emphasis in original).
Thus was born the Motion Picture Section (MPS) of the Reorientation Branch of the Army's Civil Affairs Division, which adopted the following as its statement of purpose: "The reorientation, reeducation, and democratization of the peoples of the occupied areas-Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea-through the use of effective film" (National Archives, RG319e, 3). Furthermore, the mission statement declared that "our initial reorientation task is to expose the essential falsity and depravity of police state ideology; to mirror for our audience the catastrophic results of this ideology for all mankind; and to rekindle a sense of moral responsibility in the occupied peoples." This was a program clearly designed for the defeated enemy states, Germany and Japan; Austria, which had voluntarily merged with Nazi Germany, might also be seen as a case of reorientation away from "police state ideology." But, how did this apply to Korea? If anything, a police state was emerging, not disappearing, in the form of Syngman Rhee's dictatorship in South Korea since August 1948; if the reference was to the Japanese colonial police state, then the U.S. occupation had egregiously failed to remove the most active and notorious vestige of that state, the colonial-era police force itself. What Koreans were to be reoriented toward was In fall 1948, MPS was producing one newsreel a week, some made entirely in Korea, others with sound recorded in Korea but printed in New York. As the Office of Civil Information described it, "the editorial intention was to report on film these events exactly as they happened utilizing the narrated sound track to point up [sicj the free and democratic principles being used, the genuine desire on the part of the American occupation to aid and strengthen the love of freedom and the wish for sovereignty on the part of the Korean people" (National Archives, RG 319f). The motion picture program was continuously plagued by language barriers, poorly trained technicians, shortages of supplies and equipment (16-millimeter stock ran out in April 1948, forcing the MPS to borrow from Japan), and, not least, the severance of electric power from North Korea in May 1948, on which the South had been almost completely dependent for its electricity needs.7
South Koreans themselves had begun to produce newsreels shortly after liberation, although it took some time to begin the production of feature films. Film production after liberation was in a chaotic state. The Japanese had developed an extensive motion picture industry in colonial Korea, but it was run at the top levels entirely by Japanese. 
The Soviet Zone
In Korea, as in Eastern Europe and Germany, culture played a much more central role in Soviet occupation policy, at least in the initial stages, than it did for the U.S. occupation policy. Soviet occupation authorities succeeded in cultivating support among local intelligentsia and dominating the cultural apparatuses to a degree their American counterparts often envied (Naimark 1995, 398) . This partly reflected, of course, the state control of culture within the Soviet Union itself and its application abroad. In the Soviet system and its East European offshoots, culture was treated in a way similar to the economy, with centralized planning, explicit quotas, and warlike "campaigns" (Bahro 1981, 39 ). North Korea under Soviet occupation followed this approach very closely. As a State Department study of the DPRK observed in 1951: "[mlovie and theater attendance, the number of lecture meetings, the distribution of newspapers and books, and even estimated radio audiences were set forth in advance in the economic plans as production quotas that the responsible officials and organizations were required to meet" (Department of State [19511 1961, 92) .
This was the period of "Zhdanovism" in the USSR, with the cultural sphere dominated by the policies of Stalin's cultural tsar, Andrei Zhdanov, and "socialist realism" the dominant mode of expression. After a period of relative intellectual freedom that lasted less than two years, the North Korean literary scene would enter its own "Zhdanovist" phase of state-dictated socialist realism in spring 1947 (Kwon 1991 [19511 1961, 76) . Schooling was to begin with five years of compulsory primary school (inmin hakkyo, or "people's schools"), followed by a threeyear lower middle school, and then a three-year higher middle school. Graduates of the higher middle schools could attend technical college or university, including Kim II Sung University, which was established in October 1946; higher education was to be funded by state scholarships (National Archives, RG 332, 18). Two aspects of the new education system seem to have been particularly popular and stand in contrast to the more conservative education reforms in the American zone. One was that, in contrast to the elitist education of colonial and precolonial times, schools were open to members of all classes, giving preference to children of workers and peasants. Second, the regime made a concerted effort to attack illiteracy, promoting the use of phonetic hangul, instead of Chinese characters, and setting up courses to teach reading This approach is most strikingly evident in the first feature film produced in the DPRK, Nae Kohyang (My hometown), which was released in 1949 (see fig. 6 ).12 Although the North Korean film industry produced fewer films than the South Korean film industry-a grand total of two feature films was made in North Korea before the Korean War, as opposed to some three dozen in the South-the technical and artistic quality of Nae Kohyang is arguably higher than that of any South Korean film of the Ok-tan: Oh-General Kim II Sung has given the land to our peasants. Kwan-p'il: Yes. From now on, the land belongs to the peasants forever. Nae Kohyang is a remarkable encapsulation of the fundamental myths that would shape the DPRK's image of itself for decades to come. It is nationalist state propaganda in the form of a technically and artistically sophisticated (for its time and place) feature film. North Korea, we are told, was not founded under the auspices of the Soviet Red Army but is the legitimate product of a revolutionary, anticolonial armed struggle led by Kim II Sung in Manchuria. This collapse of class struggle into anticolonial national struggle, and the embodiment of that struggle in the person of Kim II Sung in his role as an anti-Japanese resistance leader, foreshadowed by some two decades the central theme of the "juche cinema" of the late 1960s and after (Kim 1996) .13
In many ways, Nae Kohyang is a more successful film than its counterparts in the South, the patriotic "liberation films." Or at least, this is how it would appear from what we know secondhand-few of the South Korean films have survived. South Korean film lore would suggest, for example, that Yi Sungman kwa Tongnip hyophoe, which attempts to create a filmic hagiography of former South Korean president Syngman Rhee in much the same way that Nae Kohyang glorifies Kim II Sung, was an artistic disaster best left forgotten. In the microcosmic cultural cold war emerging between South and North Korea, the North concentrated its cultural and economic resources far more directly on the "struggle for the hearts and minds of the people" than did the South. Within a year of Nae Kohyang's release, howeyer, the North-South political competition would erupt into a brutal fratricidal war that would draw in both the U.S. and China.
War and Occupation
The Korean People's Army (KPA) struck south across the thirty-eighth parallel on 25 June 1950. The KPA included hundreds of "cultural officers" who attempted to reconstruct the educational and cultural system in the South along North Korean lines. The political, economic, social, and cultural transformation of the previous five years in the North was instituted in one stroke, over a matter of three months, in the KPA-occupied South. When General Douglas MacArthur led the UN forces against the North Koreans and then across the thirty-eighth parallel in September and early October, a countervailing transformation was then imposed on the North. This military conquest of a communist society was a unique experience in the history of 3Juche, usually translated as "self-reliance," was the highly nationalistic and even autarkic ideology that became the DPRK's "ruling principle" of politics, as well as culture, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was very closely associated with the "cult" that burgeoned at that time of Kim II Sung and his family. the cold war in every respect, not least of which was the opportunity to reform the minds of a population "brainwashed" by communist propaganda. The U.S.-UN-ROK occupation of North Korea from early October to late November 1950 offered an unprecedented opportunity for Americans to study the "psychology of communism." In October-November 1950, the United States Air Force commissioned a psychological study of refugees from North Korea and South Koreans who had lived through the ninety-day communist occupation of the South. The study concluded that the communist "monopoly of information" had been "at least 90% effective" (Schramm and Riley 1951a, 765; Schramm and Riley 1951b). Nevertheless, there were "cracks" in this monolithic information control: people had secretly listened to radio broadcasts from the South; rumors from the outside spread through well-established networks of friends, relatives, and neighbors; even if active resistance was minimal, there were those who quietly refused to believe the propaganda.
After five years of a highly compressed revolutionary experience in society, economy, politics, and culture, enthusiasm for the North Korean system had already begun to wane. According to interviews with North Korean residents conducted by U.S. military personnel during the UN occupation, mainly in the areas of Wonsan and Hungnam on the east coast, support for the communists had fallen most sharply among the peasants, who had originally been the greatest beneficiaries of the reforms (National Archives, RG 497, 2-5). Although the numbers may reflect more the U.S. military's obsession with quantification than they do observable reality, these interviews with North Korean residents in order to determine their attitudes toward the UN forces do suggest the varying degrees of disillusionment with the DPRK regime according to one's social group. Measuring from a high point of support for the regime around the time of the spring-summer 1946 reforms (including land redistribution to the poor peasantry), the following "disillusionment statistics" emerge (see table 1) . Support for the regime had dropped the most among farmers. Among industrial workers, support for the communist program had lessened but was still substantial. Support was highest among intellectuals and students, both in North Korea and in the areas of South Korea that had been occupied by the KPA. The high degree of support for communism among educated Koreans was worrisome and meant that the reeducation of this group would need to be a priority if reorientation of the society as a whole were to be successful. The U.S. military was optimistic that the majority of students who opposed the UN intervention could "be swayed by deeds" and come to understand that "only by joining their new government [i.e., the U.S.-UN-ROK occupation] can they realize the Korea they all hope for" (National Archives, RG 497, 5). Clearly a new kind of reorientation-something similar to the process still underway in defeated Germany and Japan-was an urgent task for the UN forces table 2 ). The ROK plan called for a multimedia operation that would eliminate all visual and aural evidence of the communist regime in every province, county, and village. Propaganda units at each provincial seat would consist of two painters, two theater artists, two musicians, and one religious leader, and these units would make extensive use of strongly anticommunist refugees from the North. After the "cleansing and extinction of communist-inspired music," for example, "newly made songs, martial music and lyrics inspiring racial spirit" would be "propagated and publicized throughout the broadcasting system and various recitals, street marches and broadcast cars" (National Archives, RG 319b, 2). Individuals would be categorized according to ideological orientation and would then be reeducated: in descending order of political reliability, (1) In November the State Department, in consultation with U.S. military leaders, drafted a "Reorientation Plan for Korea"-all of Korea-which acknowledged that "we must admit that communist propaganda developed a certain degree of success in both North and South Korea" (National Archives, RG 319a, 9). The State Department's priority would be information, and the reconstruction of the educational system would be handled by the UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as part of postwar rehabilitation. There was an enormous information vacuum to fill: the State Department's plan noted that "the North Koreans have been shut off from the outside world since 1941," when the Pacific War led to the Japanese blackout of Western news; the North Koreans were not even aware that the U.S.-not the Soviet Union-had defeated Japan in World War II (National Archives, RG 319a, 7). Under such conditions "it may be assumed that among the uneducated people shut off from the rest of the world there has been a good deal of acceptance of the communist line" (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). Therefore, an extensive, intensive, and appropriate program of reorientation had to be implemented immediately: "The mistakes of the United States Information Service in concentrating on too sophisticated media and on the cities must be avoided," the State Department noted, and USIS should instead focus on popular media and getting its message to the rural masses (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). 14Although I have not seen the Korean original, it is most likely that this term "reconversion" is a translation of chonhyang, or tenko in Japanese, which was used in Japan and in Korea during the Japanese colonial period for the conversion of communists and socialists from their leftist ideology.
The prime media of reeducation would be motion pictures, puppet and marionette shows, speaker programs, exhibits, and hangul publications. In particular, motion pictures "offer the best media for use during the short-term re-education period" (National Archives, RG 319a, 19). The USIS motion picture production unit in Seoul needed to resume operation, and the USIS puppet section needed also to "be resumed as quickly as possible" (National Archives, RG 319a, 17). A key role would be played by returned North Korean refugees, who were to be sent back to their home regions in order to give public talks on the evils of communism and the benevolence of the UN. The USIS would coordinate this program through the use of mobile propaganda units and the establishment of reorientation centers in Seoul, Pusan, Taejon, Taegu , RG 319a, 32) . A ten-man State Department team was ready to be airlifted to Korea around 1 December, in order to carry this out. On the one hand, the obvious model for the Korean reorientation, and the source of much of its human and material resources, would be the still ongoing occupation ofJapan. On the other hand, the task in North Korea would in some ways be far more difficult. For one thing, there was no private ownership of media in North Korea, and thus private ownership and operation of newspapers and other media would have to be developed. For another, there was still a great distrust of Americans and ongoing propaganda being broadcasted from behind enemy lines to the North, as well as from China and Russia. The lack of material resources was acute, and much would have to be brought in from Japan. But, although onerous, reorientation was a priority "no less important than the maintenance of peace and order or economic rehabilitation." To begin with, a short intensive period of no more than twelve months of deprogramming would be implemented by forces on the ground, followed by a longterm consolidation and rehabilitation with the assistance of UN member states and international organizations. Priority would be given to visual media and to reaching the countryside.
The U.S. was faced with, in fact, a triple burden of reorientation, and the American planners seemed determined to make up for the mistakes and shortsightedness of the initial occupation of South Korea. The new reorientation plan sought to "[u]ndo whatever has been done to the minds of the people by the communist regime, the Japanese regime, and even the heritage of the pre-Japanese regime which stands in the way of their becoming adequate participants in an orderly, responsible, progressive and peace-loving democratic society" (National Archives, RG 319c, 1). This program was, to say the least, an ambitious one. It was, however, never to be put in place. On the very day reorientation plans were finalized, 28 November 1950, the U.S. Eighth Army began a headlong retreat south, in the face of a massive Chinese offensive (Stueck 1995, 128) . Reorientation would have to wait.
Conclusion
The United States came belatedly to fight the cultural cold war in Korea, after recognizing that it might be losing the "struggle for the hearts and minds" of the Korean people to the Soviets and their North Korean supporters. The Korean War, and especially the U.S.-UN-ROK occupation of North Korea in fall 1950, offers a striking example of the transfer of symbols, methods, and mentalities of the antifascist struggle of World War II to the anticommunist struggle of the cold war. The reorientation program for North Korea, although never actually put into practice, was a blueprint for "converting" a populace away from communism in the same way that Germans and Japanese were supposedly being transformed from Nazis and militarists into peaceful democratic citizens. After the ceasefire in 1953, this experiment was halted in the North; but largely as a result of the Korean War experience, the U.S. would remain active in the cultural arena in South Korea, as well as committing itself to military defense and economic reconstruction. One could argue that in this respect, South Korea has been a significant success for the United States. Unlike many other countries in the developing world, the Republic of Korea remained almost free of open anti-American public sentiment until the democratic explosion of the 1980s (Shin 1995) . Probably no other country in Asia-besides the Philippines, an outright colony of the U.S. for nearly half a century-has been influenced so deeply by American culture as has South Korea.
In the post-Korean War period, the encouragement of pro-American, proWestern culture and attitudes was carried out by a wide range of actors, including the U.S. government and its cultural agencies; Christian organizations (both U.S.-based and Korean); volunteer organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the 4-H Club; and private foundations, including Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and the Asia Foundation. The influence of American culture in Korea, however, is both more subtle and more ambivalent than the Manichean mentality of the cultural cold war would have it appear. As elsewhere in the world, American cultural penetration into Korea has always had its critics, even if they were relatively quiet in the years between the Korean War and the 1980s. The alternative to Americanization is no longer "Sovietization," but an assertive national culture; and issues such as the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the dominance of Hollywood over the local film industry, and unfair competition from American businesses have been the focus of intense debate and controversy over the past two decades. The emergence of South Korea as a major economic force under the umbrella of American military protection has led to a rethinking of the U.S.-Korean relationship at many levels, including the relationship between native Korean culture (however that may be defined) and an American culture that dominates the world to a degree barely imaginable in the early years of the cultural cold war. 
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